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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] In 1890, Warren and Brandeis “invented” the common law right to 
privacy in the United States.1  They declared the need for a right to 
privacy – “to be let alone”2 – because technological advancements 
                                                             
∗ Adjunct Instructor of Digital Media, Utah Valley University. B.S., Utah Valley State 
College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law; enrolling in the Ph.D. 
program in Information Science at University of Washington's Information School in 
Autumn 2011.  I would like to extend special thanks to Dr. Eoin Carolan at University 
College Dublin for his supervision of the initial draft of this article and for his helpful 
advice; Coke Newell for his helpful insights and assistance throughout this process; my 
mother, Cindy Newell, and Aprille, Annalesa, Caden, and Aspen for their love and 
support.  Finally, I’d like to thank the editors of the Richmond Journal of Law and 
Technology for their hard work and extremely helpful suggestions. 
 
1 See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1979); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 57 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth 
Simone Noveck eds., 2004). 
 
2 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d. ed. 1888)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 
(1960). 
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(photography) and business methods (yellow journalism) enabled the 
media to bring previously private details to the attention of a much larger 
audience.3  Warren and Brandeis declared, “[i]nstantaneous photographs 
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good 
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed 
from the house-tops.’”4  Because of the technological innovations of their 
day, the authors noted that, “solitude and privacy have become more 
essential to the individual” than in the past.5  Concern over the sacredness 
of private and domestic life led to the conclusion that “[t]he law . . . must 
protect privacy on the principle of an ‘inviolate personality.’”6  In essence, 
Warren and Brandeis intended to introduce continental European privacy 
concepts into U.S. jurisprudence.7 
 
[2] In the present day, new technologies continue to provide solid 
grounding for Warren and Brandeis’ concerns.  Internet technologies and 
various software platforms make it much easier to communicate and find 
information about others’ online communication.8  For many – especially 
the younger generation – the “sacred precincts” of private life have 
extended onto the information superhighway.9  Individuals, both those 
with the right to do so and those without, increasingly post, upload, or 
share personal and private details, arguments and disputes, as well as 
                                                             
3 See SOLOVE, supra note 1; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2. 
 
4 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2. 
 
5 Id. at 196; see also Avner Levin & Patricia Sanchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy 
Online, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1012 (2009). 
 
6 Levin & Abril, supra note 5 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205). 
 
7 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004) (“[I]t is best to think of the Warren and Brandeis tort 
not as a great American innovation, but as an unsuccessful continental transplant. For, 
though commentators have failed to recognize it, what the two authors set out to do was 
precisely to introduce the continental protection of privacy into America.”). 
 
8 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.   
 
9 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2; see Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.  
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intellectual property to public and private directories all over the 
Internet.10  Indeed, as interpersonal communication itself has shifted 
increasingly to electronic media, the letter has transformed into multiple 
forms of e-mail, text messages, tweets, and posts on blogs, walls, forums, 
and chat rooms.11  For some, yesterday’s closet has become today’s 
limited-access Facebook12 or MySpace13 profile.14  Indeed, these services 
allow users to dictate whom they allow to access their posted content and 
online communication.15  In fact, Facebook claims “[m]ore than 500 
million active users,” of whom fifty percent “log on to [the network] in 
any given day.”16  Despite the concerns put forth by Warren and Brandeis, 
recent judicial decisions have denied privacy protection in information 
posted to these online social networks (“OSNs”).17  These current privacy 
rulings have allowed personal information to be freely “proclaimed from 
the house-tops,” despite what many feel are reasonable expectations to the 
contrary.18  Law enforcement agencies have increasingly resorted to 
mining personal information posted to OSNs as a means to acquire 
information and identify individuals suspected of criminal activity.19  
                                                             
10 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004.  
 
11 See Charles N. Faerber, Book Versus Byte: The Prospects and Desirability of a 
Paperless Society, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 797, 827 (1999).  
 
12 Facebook.com is a registered trademark of Facebook, Inc. 
 
13 MySpace.com is a registered trademark of MySpace, Inc. 
 
14 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1019.  
 
15 See id. at 1019-20.  
 
16 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2011). 
 
17 See, e.g., Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009); Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 27 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); 
Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 20 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); see 
also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2. 
 
18 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
19 See, e.g., Matthew J. Hodge, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the 
“New” Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 95-96 (2006); 
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OSNs have even played the stage for criminal confessions.20  Often, robust 
privacy laws have failed to translate effectively when applied to these new 
technologies.21 
 
[3] In an eighteenth century English case concerning copyright law, a 
dissenting Justice proclaimed: “[i]t is certain every man has a right to keep 
his own sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge whether 
he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his 
friends.”22  Regardless of how this right has developed in various 
jurisdictions, recent cases have not given it much weight where parties 
have tried to argue for privacy rights in information posted to online social 
networking profiles.23  Recent cases have determined it irrelevant whether 
or not the profile is accessible to the public at large or only to the user’s 
“friends.”24  These cases have involved intrusion by both private and 
public actors, therefore implicating both common law and constitutional 
theories of privacy protection in the United States.25  Holding that there is 
                                                                                                                                                       
Autumn K. Leslie, Note, Online Social Networks and Restrictions on College Athletes: 
Student Censorship?, 5 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 33 (2008).  
 
20 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Myspace Confession Dooms North 
Augusta Bank Robber (May 28, 2009), available at http://columbia.fbi.gov/ 
dojpressrel/2009/co052809.htm. 
 
21 SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 6-7.  
 
22 Millar v Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 242; 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (Yates, J., 
dissenting). 
 
23 See generally Sharon Nelson, John Simek & Jason Foltin, The Legal Implications of 
Social Networking, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2009) (noting several cases where 
police use information posted to social networking sites in their investigations). 
 
24 See Kathleen Elliot Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal 
Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 375 (2010) (“Even if a user utilizes 
privacy settings, it may not protect her from blurred boundaries that result in subpoenas, 
discovery, ethical and legal issues, and private postings becoming public.”). 
 
25 See Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 288, 313-14 (2001) (explaining that constitutional, common law, and legislative 
approaches to privacy only afford limited protection to private and public actors utilizing 
the Internet). 
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no reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet postings posits an 
unreasonable standard for those who view their limited-access posts on 
Facebook or MySpace as private, or at least quasi-private, where the 
number of “friends” who can access the information is high, and deserving 
of some sort of privacy protection.26   However, some view these 
standards as dictated by individuals out of touch with the expectations of 
the millions of individuals using such online services.27   
 
[4] Present United States privacy law – despite being made up of a 
patchwork of federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common law28 
– is predominantly based on the ideals of individual control, autonomy, 
and liberty from governmental intrusion,29 despite the fact that its 
inspiration was an idea grounded on the importance of protecting human 
dignity and an “inviolate personality.”30  Comparatively, Europe has 
predominantly taken the second position – that privacy protects human 
                                                             
26 Cf. David V. Richards, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case for 
Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1357 (2007) (explaining that it is necessary to revisit the law since 
much potential harm exists for Internet publication and the current law does not address 
online defamation or privacy invasion).    
 
27 See Leslie, supra note 19, at 34 (“Because online social networks are such a new 
media, originating less than five years ago, little public opinion as to the privacy interest 
expected therein is available since the Supreme Court has yet to deal with this issue.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 
28 See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 56 (“Information privacy law consists of a mosaic of 
various types of law: tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, 
evidentiary privileges, property law, and contract law.”); Helms, supra note 25 (“Because 
there is no absolute right to privacy, constitutional claims, privacy torts, and federal 
statutes have created a patchwork of protection that protects privacy only within certain 
limited situations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
29 See Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and 
Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTOWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 360 (2005) 
(noting that Americans envision their privacy rights in terms of individual liberty, 
freedom and control). 
 
30 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205. 
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dignity and fosters personal relationships.31  The European view also 
promotes individual autonomy, although it does so in a different fashion 
and perhaps to a greater extent, as this Article suggests.32  This view of 
privacy and individual autonomy embeds an element of human dignity 
into its analysis of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, 
rather than strictly tying reasonableness to ideas of control and waiver.33  
This conception is also more in line with the view that “[w]ithout our 
privacy, we lose ‘our very integrity as persons’ . . . .”34  Privacy may 
signify a fundamental human right,35 although this view has been 
challenged.36 
 
[5] In the United States, the Fourth Amendment protects an 
individual’s privacy interest in his person, home, and belongings from 
governmental intrusion when the individual has a subjective expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.37  Similarly, 
courts in Canada and Europe have predicated privacy protection on a 
reasonable expectation standard by using the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (“Charter”)38 and the European Convention for the 
                                                             
31 See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 390 (noting that European principles of 
privacy “guarantee the dignity of the individuals to whom the data belong”). 
 
32 See id. (“What these principles do offer is protection of the public persona European 
citizens perceive themselves to have, protection of their image as they would like others 
to see it.”). 
 
33 See id. at 388-89 (explaining that Europe is more concerned with preserving dignity 
protection among society’s members than worrying about governmental intrusion). 
 
34 Whitman, supra note 7, at 1153 (quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 
(1968)). 
 
35 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7-8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 
10 [hereinafter European Charter]; Whitman, supra note 7, at 1153. 
 
36 See Whitman, supra note 7, at 1154-55. 
 
37 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
38 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter], 
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/charter/CHART_E.pdf. 
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)39 to 
balance competing individual and public interests.  This Article argues 
that the subjective expectation of privacy in information posted to  
limited-access social media websites – also described as the notion of 
“network privacy”40 – is an expectation that society recognizes as 
reasonable in the twenty-first century.   
 
[6] This Article furthers Professor Levin’s and Professor Abril’s 
reasoning to conclude that judges ought to adopt a more contemporary 
view of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context 
of digital communication and online “communities.”41  Implementing a 
more modern view is especially imperative when courts consider 
questions concerning limited-access information posted to online social 
media websites.  Furthermore, this Article argues that European-based 
privacy laws focusing on the right to a private life, viewing privacy as a 
respected aid to relationship building and as a vehicle to protect personal 
dignity,42 more accurately reflect the realities of the digital age and 
properly protect individual privacy on the Internet.  By protecting 
autonomy through principles based on human dignity and recognizing that 
reasonable expectations can have their place in the context of online 
communities and digital communication, albeit often mediated and less 
private than some forms of offline communication, privacy laws would 
more effectively protect individuals and their constitutional concerns.  
Recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have laid the 
theoretical groundwork required for heightened protection of human 
dignity in online environments by espousing interpretations of reasonable 
expectations of privacy that, if applied to these online situations, would 
result in more protection for users posting information to OSNs. 
                                                             
39 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 8, Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ 
EnglishAnglais.pdf (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
 
40 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1045. 
 
41 See generally id. at 1047 (arguing that privacy laws should change to focus more on 
the contemporary and informally recognized “notion of network privacy”).   
 
42 See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 388. 
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II.  DIVERGENT NOTIONS OF PRIVACY: DIGNITY, LIBERTY, OR CONTROL? 
 
[7] Commentators around the world have debated the proper 
theoretical basis on which privacy ought to be protected.43  The two most 
prevalent theories of privacy in the Western world are based on: 1) the 
right to control the release of personal information, and 2) the importance 
of protecting human dignity and fostering human relationships.44  Note, 
however, that “that the concept of privacy is embarrassingly difficult to 
define.”45  To segment privacy regimes into exclusive theoretical groups – 
or even attempt to define privacy in a comparative context – requires 
generalization that will not always yield wholly accurate results.46  That 
being said, such a conceptual exercise provides a helpful foundation for 
privacy analysis.  This Article will attempt to follow some accepted 
generalities about the approaches of various jurisdictions and present 
conclusions based on those broad conceptions. 
 
[8] The European emphasis on protecting the private life has its roots 
in the laws of France and Germany.47  These regimes initially sanctified 
personal dignity and honor to protect the elite.48  Today, the European 
Charter embodies this guarantee,49 defended by the ECHR.  The European 
Charter states that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable.  It must be respected 
                                                             
43 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1007-08 (noting that privacy has been 
conceptualized as the right to be “let alone,” the right to exercise “control over personal 
matters or information,” or the value of “personhood, intimacy, social relationships, and 
secrecy”). 
 
44 Id. at 1008.  
 
45 Whitman, supra note 7, at 1153. 
 
46 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1007-08 (discussing an absence of unanimity in 
privacy regimes, one conception preferred over another based on a particular society’s 
“distinct historical and sociological influences, norms, and values”). 
 
47 See id. at 1014; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214 (“The right to 
privacy . . . has already found expression in the law of France.”). 
 
48 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1013-14. 
 
49 See European Charter, supra note 35, at art. 1. 
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and protected.”50  It also provides individuals with the “right to respect for 
his or her private and family life, home and communications.”51  
Similarly, the ECHR establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” the 
exercise of which no public authority shall interfere with except when 
such “is in accordance with the law and is necessary” to protect 
democratic interests of public well-being.52  This conception protects an 
individual from situations where unwarranted publicity would violate 
personal dignity.53  As described in a recent English decision, the law 
protects an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, “even in 
circumstances where there is no pre-existing relationship giving rise of 
itself to an enforceable duty of confidence. . . . because the law is 
concerned to prevent the violation of a citizen's autonomy, dignity, and 
self-esteem.”54  As such, European jurisdictions typically grant high levels 
of personal privacy protection in various areas “from consumer rights… to 
discovery in civil litigation.”55   
 
[9] This theory of privacy protects the “inviolate personality” 
conceived by Warren and Brandeis56 and, like those authors, views the 
“prime enemy of our privacy . . . [as] the media, which always threatens to 
broadcast unsavory information about us in ways that endanger our public 
dignity.”57  Although perhaps more dominant in some jurisdictions, many 
                                                             
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. at art. 7. 
 
52 ECHR, supra note 39. 
 
53 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1013 (describing respect for individual dignity as 
the value shared by all privacy interests). 
 
54 Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers, Ltd., [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [7] (Eng.); see also 
Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161. 
 
55 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1015 (footnote omitted); see also Whitman, supra note 
7, at 1156. 
 
56 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205; see also Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 
1012. 
 
57 Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161. 
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western states also place great importance on the autonomous ability to 
control personal information.58  The right to control personal information 
plays a role in European law, notably manifesting itself in the right of an 
individual to control his or her public image.59   
 
[10] American privacy law, on the other hand, is based primarily on the 
political value of liberty from government intrusion60 and sovereignty 
within the home, rather than public image or social dignity.61  However, 
American law also upholds the right to control access to and the 
dissemination of personal information.62  This focus on individual liberty 
to control personal information allows the individual to determine which 
information to keep private and which information to release into the 
public domain.63  Ideas of assumption of risk and privacy waiver have 
found strong footholds in this control-based jurisprudence.64  Along with 
such autonomy, this conception also “places the burden of ‘remaining 
private’ squarely on the individual, who is ultimately without recourse 
from existing law or technology . . . .”65  Despite the importance of 
Warren and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy in American privacy law, the 
United States has not yet heeded their call to protect the “inviolate 
personality.”66     
                                                             
58 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1009. 
 
59 See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161 (“[The German] right to informational self-
determination [is defined as] the right to control the sorts of information disclosed about 
oneself.”). 
 
60 See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29; Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161. 
 
61 See Whitman, supra note 7, at 1161-62. 
 
62 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1008. 
 
63 See id. at 1008-09. 
 
64 See generally Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and 
Online Social Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 78-80 (2007). 
 
65 Id. at 78. 
 
66 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205; see Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 
383. 
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[11] Again, note that the distinction between liberty and dignity is not 
as much black and white as it is shades of grey.67  Much crossover exists.68  
Additionally, notions about predicating the reasonableness of an 
expectation of privacy on the amount of control exercised over personal 
information in question is not without some mutual recognition.69  In the 
context of OSN privacy, however, commentators have described the idea 
that individual control of information is a sufficient test of the 
reasonableness of the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy as 
“simplistic,” “ill-fitting and impossible.”70  These commentators reason 
that the test is based on “the mistaken assumption that such control is 
possible on- or off-line.”71  To properly support a more ideal 
contemporary conception of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy online, a healthy respect for control and liberty must be balanced 
with more substantive recognition of the reputational benefits of 
protecting human dignity. 
 
 
 
                                                             
67 Whitman, supra note 7, at 1162-63 (“[T]his contrast is not absolute.  These are 
complex societies, which are home to a variety of sensibilities, concerns, traditions, and 
mutual influences.  There are certainly some Americans who find the European idea of 
dignity appealing.  This is notably true of Justice Kennedy, whose opinion for the Court 
in Lawrence v. Texas [123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003)] expresses admiration for European 
approaches, and who tries energetically to found his opinion on ideals of both liberty and 
dignity.  For that matter, there are no doubt Europeans who find the characteristic 
American approach appealing.  Moreover, it is certainly the case that both forms of the 
protection of privacy are in force to some extent on both sides of the Atlantic: There are 
some protections against the media and the like in the United States, and there are 
certainly some American tort cases protecting people's public image.  As for Europe: 
There are certainly some quite far-reaching protections against the state there, and there is 
certainly law protecting people within the bounds of the home.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 
68 See id. 
 
69 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1009; Abril, supra note 64, at 76 (claiming that 
those who view their online existence as their own personal space, the “digital natives,” 
are more likely to feel violated by Internet privacy breaches than their less “cyber-savvy” 
counterparts, the “digital immigrants”). 
 
70 Abril, supra note 64, at 78. 
 
71 Id. 
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III.  CHANGING EXPECTATIONS IN THE WORLD OF  
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
[12] Commentators have noticed the dichotomy between traditional 
privacy law – at least in those jurisdictions that base privacy on the ideals 
of liberty and the right to control information – and recent trends emerging 
in online communities.72  Commentators call the dichotomy a “privacy 
contradiction” because “users of social networking websites tend to 
disclose much personal information online, yet they seem to retain an 
expectation of privacy.”73  Under traditional views of privacy and the 
Internet – held by those whom Professor Palfrey calls “digital 
immigrants”74 – there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything 
posted anywhere on the Internet.75  Indeed, recent judicial decisions have 
echoed these views,76 and have also made quite a stir in online chatter.77  
Some call the distinction between “digital immigrants” and “digital 
natives”78 “the greatest generation gap since the early days of rock and 
roll.”79   
                                                             
72 See, e.g., Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002; John G. Palfrey, Jr., Commentary, 
Should Fred Hire Mimi Despite Her Online History?, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2007, at 42 
(describing the recent trend of revealing “compromising photos [and] embarrassing 
conversations” online, despite the fact many people would likely deem such information 
highly private). 
 
73 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004. 
 
74 Palfrey, supra note 72, at 42. 
 
75 See Abril, supra note 64, at 77 (“To the digital immigrant, [online social network] 
privacy is an absurd oxymoron.”). 
 
76 See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009); Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 18-19, 32, 36 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. 
J.) (WL); Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, paras. 1, 4, 17, 19, 20 (Can. Ont. 
Sup. Ct. J.) (WL). 
 
77 See, e.g., Digital Immigrant, URBANDICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/ 
define.php?term=digital+immigrant (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (discussing how by the 
time this was written, the phrase “digital immigrant” has received more than 3,500 votes 
and comments on the popular website). 
78 Palfrey, supra note 72. 
 
79 Abril, supra note 64, at 73. 
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[13] Commentators have noted, “online social networking poses a 
fundamental challenge to the theory of privacy as control.”80  The stakes 
have been raised because digital technologies lack “the relative transience 
of human memory,”81 and can be trolled or data mined for information in 
ways previously unthinkable.82  Digital dossiers contain growing amounts 
of information from all over the Internet that can result in real world 
harm.83 Admittedly, many new technologies may provide a greater ability 
to control how, where, and when we publish our private information, if we 
do so at all.84  However, the nature of the growing participatory Internet 
poses a greater risk that online socializers will post “unflattering, 
defamatory, or personal information about each other, and that this 
information would in turn be available to a large, if not unrestricted, online 
audience.”85  The Internet and OSNs allow third parties the luxury of 
broadcasting other people’s personal information to large audiences much 
more easily than through older, more established, modes of 
communication that existed throughout much of privacy law’s 
development.86  Some have expressed the view that this change will have 
profound effects on the concept of reputation in the years to come.87   
 
                                                             
80 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002. 
 
81 Abril, supra note 64, at 75. 
 
82 See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 57 
(1999). 
 
83 See id. (“A person’s digital dossier can betray him in the physical world, resulting in 
harms like the denial or loss of employment, shame and embarrassment, denigration of 
reputation, or merely exposure in an unwanted light.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 2-3. 
 
84 Cf. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 223 (describing how digital dossiers will affect individual 
freedom and power). 
 
85 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002. 
 
86 See id. at 1006-07. 
 
87 See id. See generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 2-4 (2007). 
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[14] The other side of the coin concerns the release of one’s own 
personal information onto the Internet.  This information is often not 
released to the public at large but, in many instances, to large numbers of 
“friends” on a user’s MySpace or Facebook profile.88  Some courts have 
begun to take the view that this release of information to a large number of 
friends is essentially the same as releasing it to the public at large, despite 
the user’s subjective expectation to the contrary.89  Strictly tying the 
reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy to ideas of control 
and waiver, relevant in the traditional offline context, neglects to consider 
whether the subjective expectations of the Internet community, a 
substantial and growing percentage of our society, ought to be afforded 
greater weight – perhaps even considered reasonable in certain 
circumstances.90  Granted, completely disregarding the connection 
between control, waiver through releasing information, and the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in that information would 
prove foolhardy.91  However, courts may more satisfactorily address this 
paradox by reading an element of human dignity – such as that found in 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights – into the 
theoretical basis for protecting privacy in information posted to OSNs.92 
 
[15] Professors Levin and Abril recently published the results of an 
empirical study in which they examined the OSN activity and privacy 
expectations of 2,500 students in the United States and Canada.93  After 
reviewing the results of the study, the professors outlined a “theory of 
                                                             
88 See Statistics, supra note 16 (“[the] [a]verage user has 130 friends.”). 
 
89 See, e.g., Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) 
(WL) (equating a private or limited access Facebook profile with a public profile); 
Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 20 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL)) 
(discussing how 366 friends negated any expectation of privacy). 
 
90 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1046. 
 
91 See id. at 1046-47. 
 
92 See id. at 1014-15, 1047. 
 
93 See id. at 1004-05. 
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network privacy”94 which supported their conclusion that these “online 
socializers have developed a new and arguably legitimate notion of 
privacy online . . . .”95  Their conclusion draws a clear parallel with the 
aims of this Article; specifically, that this notion of network privacy, if 
respected, would “offer online socializers both control and protection of 
their dignity and reputation.”96  Their work recognizes the link between 
the degree of control over personal information and the amount of privacy 
protection afforded such information.97  Indeed, many of the leading OSNs 
have themselves propagated this “notion of privacy as user control.”98  An 
older version of Facebook’s privacy policy (as of Nov. 10, 2009) stated as 
its two core principles: “(1) You should have control over your personal 
information, and (2) You should have access to the information others 
want to share.”99  This ability of others to share information is precisely 
the thorn in the side of the control theory.100 
 
[16] According to the results of Levin’s and Abril’s study, a majority of 
OSN users reported that their profiles included “their real full name, home 
town, high school, relationship status, interests, hobbies, favorite music, 
books, movies, and a picture of themselves.”101  More than three fourths 
                                                             
94 Id. at 1045.  
 
95 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1002. 
 
96 Id. 
 
97 See id. at 1005. 
 
98 Id. at 1005-06. 
 
99 Id. (quoting Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2009) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoted material since removed 
from site); see also Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php 
(last modified Dec. 22, 2010) (describing the control settings for personal information); 
Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.privacy 
(last modified Feb. 28, 2008) (suggesting that user control over personal information is 
part of its core). 
 
100 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1006-07. 
 
101 Id. at 1024. 
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reported posting real photographs of themselves, and only a small 
minority reported posting fake names or photos.102  Nearly half the 
respondents reported serious concerns about strangers accessing their 
profiles.103  The respondents demonstrated selectivity in the type of 
material they posted and, reportedly, were “able to distinguish between 
personal information that allows them to socialize safely with other users 
. . . and information that could be potentially dangerous . . . .”104   
 
[17] According to the study, seventy-two percent of respondents 
manually restricted their privacy settings and more than half blocked 
specific people from viewing their profiles.105  More than sixty percent 
believed they take effective measures to protect their privacy, but many 
felt helpless protecting their character or controlling what information 
others post about them.106  Levin and Abril concluded that these results 
“illustrate[] the difficulty of combining control-oriented privacy protection 
tools and policies with dignity-based concerns in a coherent manner.  The 
domination of control-oriented tools leads to the dismissal of dignity 
concerns, while the emergence of such concerns reinforces uncertainty 
about the efficacy of such tools.”107  The study also found that similar 
percentages of respondents harbored concerns about controlling their 
information (thirty-seven percent), and many held concerns specifically 
directed toward the dignitary ends of protecting reputation and 
relationships (thirty-two percent).108  Most respondents felt strongly in 
favor of the ability to segregate the professional and personal segments of 
their lives through OSN privacy settings, such as by not allowing profile 
                                                             
102 See Id. 
 
103 Id. at 1026. 
 
104 Id. at 1025. 
 
105 Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1033. 
 
106 Id. at 1036. 
 
107 Id. 
 
108 Id. at 1038-39. 
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access to employers109 or parents.110  In sum, many online socializers do 
maintain subjective expectations of privacy – “grounded in the need to 
maintain discreet social identities, or situational personalities”111 – in 
information uploaded to OSN profiles despite their “penchant for 
disclosure.”112  Levin and Abril’s notion of “network privacy,” is therefore 
“a notion of privacy based on the expected accessibility of personal 
information to social constituencies.”113  These online socializers are more 
concerned with who views their information and how it is disseminated, 
rather than whether this information is disseminated in the first place.114   
 
[18] Granted, determining whether an individual maintains a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his or her OSN profile information cannot 
always be “scientifically gauged.”115  In fact, “the inherent nature” of the 
activity of utilizing an OSN itself often “works against any notion of an 
expectation of privacy.”116  By signing up, logging in, and posting 
information, the user has shown clear intention “to publicize [the] 
information to others.”117  These actions show clearer intention to 
disseminate personal information than in the case of an e-mail or 
telephone call because of the typical number of recipients.118  Therefore, 
OSN profile information appears similar to a “yearbook, directory, or 
bulletin board,” where “users are communicating information for more 
                                                             
109 See id. at 1026, 1043. 
 
110 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1025-26. 
 
111 Id. at 1045. 
 
112 Id.  
 
113 Id. 
 
114 See id. at 1045-46. 
 
115 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
 
116 Hodge, supra note 19, at 106. 
 
117 Id. 
 
118 See Statistics, supra note 16. 
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than one person by posting that information on a naturally public 
platform.”119  However, the fact that a person has acted to prevent public 
access to such information – by selecting privacy settings that limit access 
to those recognized as “friends”120 – suggests that such analogies go too 
far.  A “mass e-mail,” available only to the intended recipients who must 
login to their respective inboxes to access the information, may provide a 
more proper analogy.121  Obvious in the context of recent decisions, the 
individual still must fight an uphill battle to show that he or she retained 
some subjective expectation of privacy in information made available to 
hundreds – or perhaps thousands – of people.122  However, the existence 
of this subjective expectation of privacy actually exists in large numbers 
of OSN users.123  It resides at a generational divide of serious depth and 
consequence.124   
 
[19] Those who have grown up with the Internet, particularly the recent 
interactive rise of web 2.0,125 view online privacy in a very different way 
than those of previous generations who have – or have not – immigrated to 
it.126  Younger “natives” expect technological barriers – whether real or 
                                                             
119 Hodge, supra note 19, at 107. 
 
120 See id. at 110; see also Privacy Policy, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
policy.php (last revised Dec. 22, 2010).  
 
121 See U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 412 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“Messages sent to the public 
at large in the ‘chat room’ or e-mail that is ‘forwarded’ from correspondent to 
correspondent lose any semblance of privacy.”); Hodge, supra note 19, at 110 n.110 
(“Courts have, however, hinted that an e-mail forwarded to more than one person would 
not be private.  A mass e-mail is not, though, forwarded from correspondent to 
correspondent, but instead is delivered once to many correspondents.” (citation omitted)). 
 
122 See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding 
that plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information published on 
social network web sites). 
 
123 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1045-46. 
 
124 See id. at 1017-18. 
 
125 See Matthew J. Wilson, E-Elections: Time for Japan to Embrace Online 
Campaigning, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, at *1.  
 
126 See Abril, supra note 64, at 76. 
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merely imagined – to protect their information from unintended 
audiences,127 while others view their actions as reckless and foolish.128  
One commentator has described this predicament as follows: 
 
To the digital immigrant, OSN privacy is an absurd 
oxymoron.  After all, it’s the Internet!  When faced with 
the privacy-related risks of the medium, digital immigrants 
fervently argue, “if you can’t stand the heat, get off of 
MySpace.”  This argument is consistent with their history 
of control over their personal information and the  
control-centered definitions of privacy of their generation’s 
noted legal scholars.129 
 
However, to simply place all things Internet into a basket reserved for only 
completely public information would seriously undermine the actual 
subjective – and arguably reasonable – expectations of a large and 
growing segment of society, ignore the technological protection measures 
actually available, and lead to an increasing number of unsalvageable real 
world harms stemming from the technology’s use.130  In short, that 
approach would refuse to adapt legal protection to a changing world.131  In 
this new world, OSNs remain increasingly at the center of the online 
development of personal identity; they replace and supplement their 
physical real-world counterparts from days past, such as malls or  
drive-ins.132  Affording privacy to the development of personality, 
identity, and the flowering of relationships would protect “[the] crucial 
                                                             
127 See id.; Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1033-34. 
 
128 See Abril, supra note 64, at 76; Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1004. 
 
129 Abril, supra note 64, at 77 (citing Fried, supra note 34, at 482; ALAN F. WESTIN, 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)). 
 
130 See generally id. at 86-87. 
 
131 See id. at 78 (“[P]rivacy law, technology, and ethics have not caught up to the harms 
they purportedly protect and redress.”). 
 
132 See id. at 83. 
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developmental purpose”133 of OSNs and relates to some of the explicitly 
defined purposes of ECHR-type private life protections based on a respect 
for human dignity.134 
 
IV.  REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY UNDER US TORT LAWS 
 
[20] Tort law in many U.S. states recognizes various rights to 
privacy.135  These state laws often utilize tests to determine the 
reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy.136  Many states 
provide remedies for invasions of privacy that resemble the four main 
privacy torts Prosser identified in 1960.137  Prosser concluded that these 
torts consisted of: “(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion . . . (2) 
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts . . . (3) publicity which 
places the plaintiff in a false light . . . and (4) appropriation, for the 
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”138  These torts 
came to life in response to the very thing of which Warren and Brandeis 
had warned: privacy violations of the traditional print media.139  The four 
torts Prosser defined, however, do not necessarily adapt well to privacy 
crises in cyberspace.140   
 
                                                             
133 See id. (citing Danah Boyd, Address at the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science: Identity Production in a Networked Culture: Why Youth Heart 
MySpace (Feb. 19, 2006), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/AAAS2006.html). 
 
134 See discussion infra Part VII (pertaining to ECHR Article 8’s private life 
jurisprudence). 
 
135 See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 58. 
 
136 See id. at 59-60 (showing that a commonly used test of an individual’s expectation of 
privacy is whether the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person”). 
 
137 See Prosser, supra note 2; SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 58. 
 
138 Prosser, supra note 2. 
 
139 SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 58. 
 
140 Id. at 58-59; Abril, supra note 64, at 78-81. 
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[21] The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects “‘private affairs or 
concerns’” from intrusion that “‘would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.’”141  It does not protect private matters kept in anything but  
non-public places, and, as the Internet is seen primarily as a public 
medium, this tort does not currently provide adequate protection for 
information on the Internet.142  Prosser’s second tort, publication of private 
facts, typically provides a remedy to an individual when a private matter – 
not of legitimate public concern – is broadcast to a wide audience in a way 
that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”143  The tort does not 
provide effective remedies for violations of privacy not subject to wide 
dissemination or not highly offensive.144  Additionally, the last two torts, 
false light and appropriation, are closely linked with defamation and 
intellectual property laws, respectively,145 and have limited applicability to 
invasions of privacy in the context of the information technology issues 
this Article confronts.  A state-by-state analysis of privacy related tort law 
is well outside the scope of this Article.  However, one recent California 
case is relevant to the current discussion and, quite fittingly, portrays a 
foreboding portrait of the privacy problems inherent at the intersection of 
the print media and the new medium of the Internet.146   
 
[22] In Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, the plaintiff, a U.C. Berkeley 
student, wrote a scathing ode to her central California hometown of 
Coalinga and published it to her MySpace page.147  The post began by 
stating, “the older I get, the more I realize how much I despise Coalinga” 
                                                             
141 SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 59 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B 
(1976). 
 
142 See id. 
 
143 Id. 
 
144 See id at 59-60. 
 
145 See id. at 60. 
 
146 See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 
147 See id. at 861. 
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and went on to comment negatively about the town and its inhabitants.148  
The post was only available on Moreno’s MySpace page for six days 
before she took it down.149  However, within that time, the local high 
school principal located it and forwarded it to the editor of the town 
newspaper who – without notifying or seeking permission from Moreno – 
subsequently published it in the paper’s “Letters to the Editor” section, 
attributing it as a submission from Moreno.150  As a result, Moreno’s 
family in Coalinga received death threats and a gunshot was fired at the 
family’s home.151  Because of the community’s violent reaction, the 
family moved away from Coalinga and closed their twenty-year-old 
family business.152  Moreno and her family sued the paper for invasion of 
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the court 
dismissed the privacy claim on demurrer, prior to any trial on the 
merits.153 
 
[23] California privacy law – part of the state’s constitutional law – 
largely mirrors Prosser’s four privacy torts.154  It allows remedies for four 
distinct types of harm:  “(1) intrusion into private matters; (2) public 
disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity placing a person in a false light; 
and (4) misappropriation of a person's name or likeness.”155  To succeed 
on an invasion of privacy claim, the party must demonstrate: “(1) a legally 
protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
the circumstances; and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.”156  In 
                                                             
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
149 Id. 
 
150 Id. 
 
151 Id.   
 
152 Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861. 
 
153 Id. at 860-61. 
 
154 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Atheltic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994).  
 
155 Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862. 
 
156 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Moreno, the court held that postings on publically accessible MySpace 
pages were not private, and as such, the plaintiff could not hold a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information published to her 
profile.157  “Under these circumstances,” the court stated, “no reasonable 
person would have had an expectation of privacy regarding the published 
material.”158  The court made clear that it did not require total secrecy, but 
that by publishing the ode on a fully public page, Moreno had failed to 
“define [her] circle of intimacy,”159 despite expecting that only a limited 
audience would view her page.160  In concluding Moreno maintained no 
objective expectation of privacy in her MySpace post, the court stated, 
“[b]y posting the article on myspace.com, [Moreno] opened the article to 
the public at large.  Her potential audience was vast.”161  A number of 
courts have begun to come to similar conclusions.162 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
157 Id. 
 
158 Id. 
 
159 Id. (quoting M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Cal. Ct. App 
2001)).  
 
160 Id. at 863. 
 
161 Moreno, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863 (emphasis added). 
 
162 See, e.g., Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, No. 06-5337 (FSH), 
2007 WL 7393489, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2007) (discussing online journals and diary 
entries of minors, the court stated, "[t]he privacy concerns are far less where the 
beneficiary herself chose to disclose the information"); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and 
MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information would be 
shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature 
and purpose of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist.”); Dexter v 
Dexter, No. 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 n.4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2007) 
(stating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding Myspace writings 
open to public view). 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V.  REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN DIGITAL 
COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE US FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
[24] The United States Constitution, while not explicitly mentioning a 
right to privacy, does protect some elements of privacy.163  The Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits some forms of 
governmental intrusion into an individual’s private life – specifically, 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” – unless a valid warrant adequately 
authorizes such an intrusion.164  It only protects against searches where a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists.165  It states:  
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.166 
 
The Fifth Amendment, by comparison, prohibits the government from 
forcing an individual to incriminate himself.167  At one point, these 
constitutional amendments together barred government from “any forcible 
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private 
papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his 
                                                             
163 A right to privacy, for example, has been found within the penumbra of rights granted 
by the Bill of Rights, and has been articulated in cases involving contraception, abortion, 
and information – including an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of private 
matters.  See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 64-65; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 
(1977) (finding a right of privacy in personal information collected by government 
agencies); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the right of personal 
privacy includes abortion decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 
(1965) (finding that use of contraceptives lies within the zone of privacy created by 
fundamental constitutional gurantees). 
 
164 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 
165 SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 188-89. 
 
166 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 
167 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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goods,” because such compulsion is an “invasion of his indefeasible right 
of personal security, personal liberty and private property.”168  However, 
the court subsequently backed away from that position in later opinions.169  
Some scholars have argued that the Fourth Amendment focus on privacy 
is misguided and “has not fared well with the changing times.”170  Others 
argue that such a focus remains vitally important.  In fact,  “the Court’s 
failure to conceptualize privacy adequately” has given rise to many of the 
problems confronting Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the information 
age.171 
 
[25] In Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis wrote a passionate 
dissent, arguing, much in line with arguments made in his seminal article 
of 1890,172 that, by not finding police wire tapping an unreasonable search, 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence failed to properly reflect 
changing societal conditions.173  Brandeis wrote, “[c]lauses guaranteeing 
to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a 
similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”174  Thirty-nine years 
later, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted Justice 
Brandeis’s view175 and, through an influential concurrence by Justice 
                                                             
168 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 63. 
169 See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 63-64; see, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967) (overturning the mere evidence rule); Shapiro v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1948) (explaining the Fifth Amendment does not bar 
production of an individual’s records as incriminating evidence). 
170 SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 190 (quoting Scott E. Sundby, ‘Everyman’s’ Fourth 
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1751, 1771 (1994)). 
171 Id. at 190-91. 
172 See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198.  
173 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); Hodge, supra note 19, at 100. 
174 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
175 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). 
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Harlan, articulated a new two-step approach to determine the 
reasonableness of government action under the Fourth Amendment.176  
First, a person must “have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy.”177  Second, that subjective expectation must “be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”178  In Katz, as well as in Berger 
v. New York, decided earlier that same year, the Supreme Court held that 
government eavesdropping on an individual’s telephone conversation 
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, violated 
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.179  The caller, stated 
the Katz court, “is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into 
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world,”180 and therefore retains 
a privacy right in the conversation.181   
 
[26] Essentially, to implicate a Fourth Amendment violation, a 
subjective expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable.182  
Exceptions do exist, of course, and include police searches in “hot 
pursuit,”183 protective sweeps of cars,184 limited stops and frisks based on 
reasonable suspicion,185 searches incident to a lawful arrest186 and, in 
                                                             
176 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring); Hodge, supra note 19, at 100. 
177 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
178 Id. (emphasis added). 
179 See Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967); Katz, 389 U.S. at 359; see also 
Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th 
Cir. 2008). 
180 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
181 Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 352). 
182 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 101. 
183 See Warden, 387 U.S. at 310. 
184 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982). 
185 See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 189 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968)). 
186 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 
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certain circumstances, searches of electronic communications stored for 
more than 180 days187 – although the constitutionality of this statutory 
provision has been questioned.188  This subjective determination is “an 
empirical question which fact finders decide using the evidence from each 
individual case.”189  The test laid out in Katz operates in the context of 
protecting an individual’s expectation of privacy in his telephone 
communications.190  Logically, some lower courts have extended it to 
encompass communication in a digital context,191 although some lower 
court judges have not been keen to apply analogies developed in the 
physical world to an electronic one.192  However, in 2010, the Supreme 
Court finally weighed in on the issue, in City of Ontario v. Quon.193 
 
[27] In Quon, the Supreme Court held that a public employer’s detailed 
search of a police officer’s pager text messages was ultimately reasonable 
because it was “motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose,” “was not 
                                                             
187 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
188 See generally Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2007) 
vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 
189 Hodge, supra note 19, at 101; see Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing 
Fourth Amendment Protection for Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1591, 
1596 n.55 (1997). 
190 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).  
191 See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (“So 
long as the risk-analysis approach of Katz remains valid, however, this court is compelled 
to apply traditional legal principles to this new and continually evolving technology.”), 
aff’d 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000). 
192 See, e.g., United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The advent of 
the electronic age and . . . the development of desktop computers . . . go beyond the 
established categories of constitutional doctrine.  Analogies to other physical objects, 
such as dressers or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we now face as judges 
when applying search and seizure law.” (footnote omitted)); Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 
508 (“Cyberspace is a nonphysical ‘place’ and its very structure, a computer and 
telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment 
analysis.”); see also Hodge, supra note 19, at 102. 
193 See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010). 
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excessive in scope,” and would likely be “‘regarded as reasonable and 
normal in the private-employer context.’”194  The Ontario Police 
Department searched transcripts of Quon’s pager messages – after Quon 
surpassed his monthly character allotment – to determine whether the 
excess resulted from work related messaging (implying the department’s 
character limit was too low) or private communication.195  When Quon’s 
employer discovered the sexually explicit, non-work related nature of the 
text messages, his supervisor referred the matter to the department’s 
internal affairs division, which ultimately disciplined Quon for his 
conduct.196  Quon sued on Fourth Amendment grounds, claiming the 
search was unreasonable, but the United States Supreme Court 
disagreed.197  Before making its pronouncement, however, the court 
stated, “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth 
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society 
has become clear.”198  Assuming Quon indeed “had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in [his] text messages,” the court analogized the 
search to one involving “a government employer’s search of an 
employee’s physical office” space, and found the invasion justified.199 
 
[28] In the landmark case of Smith v. Maryland, the United States 
Supreme Court held an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
cannot extend to non-substantive information – such as the numbers  
dialed – gathered by devices such as pen registers because, unlike the 
eavesdropping in Katz and Berger, “pen registers do not acquire the 
contents of communications.”200  The court’s holding rested on the 
                                                             
194 Id. at 2632-33.  
195 See id. at 2625-26. 
196 Id. at 2626. 
197 See id. at 2626, 2632. 
198 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.  
199 Id. at 2630. 
200 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979); see Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 
455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); Hodge, supra note 19, at 
103. 
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premise that “[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone 
numbers to the telephone company” because their monthly bills reflect 
these numbers.201  Although discarding the possibility of any objective 
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s claim, the Court also held that “even if 
petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers 
he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not ‘one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”202   
 
[29] The Smith decision allowed the government to acquire non-content 
information derived from the register, namely the numbers the customer 
dials,203 but continued to protect the contents of the individual’s 
communication.  Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, argued that an 
expectation of privacy in the communication’s contents remains 
reasonable even though “[t]he telephone conversation itself must be 
electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be 
recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment.”204  
However, United States v. Miller put this proposition to the test when 
Justice Powell – invoking the concept that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties”205 – wrote that when a party discloses information to another he 
“takes the risk . . . that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government.”206  The court has applied this assumption of risk 
exception in a variety of contexts to defeat Fourth Amendment claims,207 
                                                             
201 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Hodge, supra note 19, at 103. 
202 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 (quoting Katz, 389 U.s. at 361) ; accord Hodge, supra note 19, 
at 103. 
203 Accord Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470; see Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42.  
204 Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
205 Id. at 743–44. 
206 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
207 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“[W]hen an individual 
reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal 
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit governmental use of that information.”); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 
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and the Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen reiterated the 
exception eight years after the Miller decision.208  Therefore, no 
reasonable expectation of privacy can exist in regard to the actions of 
other parties to the communication and, potentially, to information 
channelled through an intermediary.   
 
[30] Obviously, Smith, Miller, and Jacobsen stand strongly for the 
proposition that society, at least in the late 1970s and mid 1980s, was not 
prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in some types of 
personal information, especially in non-content information shared with 
third parties.209  In contrast, however, Congress and many state courts 
have taken a different view.210  Congress enacted legislation that partially 
superseded both Smith and Miller,211 and many state courts have rejected 
those holdings in favor of broader privacy rights based on state 
constitutional provisions.212 
                                                                                                                                                       
419 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that the sender of an e-mail runs the risk that its recipient 
will publish the contents); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) 
(noting the assumption of risk exception through information contained in records 
entrusted to a bank officer); Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (noting the assumption of risk 
exception through customer's bank records); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 
(1971) (noting the assumption of risk exception through confidences exchanged in 
private conversation); United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. Ct. 
2007) (“[T]here can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in matters voluntarily 
disclosed or entrusted to third parties, even those disclosed to a person with whom one 
has a confidential business relationship.”). 
208 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. 
209 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 103; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; Miller, 425 U.S. at 
442-43.  See generally Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117 (holding that a party assumes the risk 
that information will be disclosed to the government when it is voluntarily provided to a 
third party). 
210 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 103-04. 
211 See 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (2006) (“A Government authority may obtain financial records . 
. . only if [the records] . . . are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry . . . [and 
if] a copy of the summons has been served on the customer . . . .”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
3121 (2006) (stating that most pen registers may only be used with a court order). 
212 Hodge, supra note 19, at 104 (citing Frances A. Gilligan & Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
Cyberspace: The Newest Challenge for Traditional Legal Doctrine, 24 RUTGERS 
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[31] An additional exception has also been applied in circumstances 
where a private party infringes upon the privacy of the individual prior to 
any government action.213  In this situation, the police can piggyback onto 
the private party’s breach without causing additional harm to an already 
frustrated expectation of privacy, thus avoiding a Fourth Amendment 
violation.214  The police can also conduct a more thorough or intensive 
search without violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest “so long as they do not ‘significantly expand’ upon or ‘change the 
nature’ of the underlying private search.”215  Courts have applied this 
                                                                                                                                                       
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 305, 330–31 (1998) (“There is a parallel between Miller and 
Smith: Both cases have been rejected by state courts . . .”)); see, e.g., Charnes v. 
Digiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); People v. Jackson, 452 
N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-18 (Utah 
1991).  
213 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.  
214 See id. at 117; United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
2007) (“Where the State is simply the passive recipient of evidence gathered by a private 
party acting without the State's instigation or direction, a defendant incriminated by that 
evidence has no recourse to the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489-90 (1971) (holding that the government did not violate 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment right by seizing guns voluntarily given to them by 
defendant’s wife); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding evidence of a vigilante computer hacker who provided authorities with digital 
images of the defendant engaging in sexual activity with a child); United States v. 
Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding government’s use of 
photocopied materials the defendant's employee secretly made and mailed to the FBI); 
United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1987) (approving the 
government’s use of incriminating documents supplied by a disgruntled employee that 
implicated her supervisor in a crime); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 400-01 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (upholding conviction based on pornography discovered by a curious freight 
agent who opened a package without the defendant’s authorization); Ward v. State, 351 
A.2d 452, 454-55 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (allowing incriminating evidence provided 
by defendant’s daughter who gave it to the police without his permission or knowledge). 
215 D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (quoting United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 
452 (5th Cir. 2001)); see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115 ("The additional invasions of [a 
defendant's] privacy by the Government agent must be tested by the degree to which they 
exceeded the scope of the private search."); see also Paul v. State, 57 P.3d 698, 702-03 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (holding that police did not intrude on any Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy by reviewing the entirety of an obscene videotape that had been 
partially viewed by a private citizen).  
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exception recently in circumstances where an anonymous caller had given 
authorities password and username information related to another 
individual’s online photo storage and a government agent used the 
information to search the directory and locate incriminating photographs 
of criminal behavior.216 
 
A.  No Expectations of Privacy in Non-Content Data 
 
[32] Federal and State courts have begun to apply this Supreme Court 
precedent in the context of digital communication and Internet activity.217  
Interestingly, although not unexpectedly, one District Court observed in 
2007 that “[t]he Smith line of cases has led federal courts to uniformly 
conclude that internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their subscriber information, the length of their stored files, and other  
non-content data to which service providers must have access.”218  
 
B.  Expectations of Privacy in the Content of Digital Communication 
 
[33] One district court recently ruled that it was “obvious that a claim to 
privacy is unavailable to someone who places information on an 
indisputably, public medium, such as the Internet, without taking any 
                                                             
216 See D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. at 122. 
217 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 101. 
218 D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 120; see Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 
2001) (holding that a user loses any expectation of privacy in personal subscription 
information when it is conveyed to a system operator); United States v. Cox, 190 F. 
Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[C]riminal defendants have no Fourth Amendment 
privacy interest in subscriber information given to an internet service provider.”); see 
also United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000)  ("Congress 
clearly intended for suppression not to be an option for a defendant whose electronic 
communications have been intercepted in violation of [the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act]."), aff’d, 106 Fed. Appx. 688 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gines-Perez, 
214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) vacated on other grounds by, 90 Fed. Appx. 3 
(1st Cir. 2004); BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78481, at *14 (D.C.S.C. 
2007) (holding plaintiffs cannot complain that an authorized photo on the Internet was 
linked to by a blogger in a negative blog post); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 
504, 509 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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measures to protect the information.”219  Continuing, the court stated, “[a] 
person who places information on the information superhighway clearly 
subjects said information to being accessed by every conceivable 
interested party.  Simply expressed, if privacy is sought, then public 
communication mediums such as the Internet are not adequate forums 
without protective measures.”220  The court, therefore, declared that 
society was not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in a photograph on the Internet.221  The Court further stated,  
 
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet 
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights 
to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as 
here, where the Defendant did not employ protective 
measures or devices that would have controlled access to 
the Web page or the photograph itself.222 
 
This reasoning seems in line with Fourth Amendment law surrounding the 
plain view doctrine.223  When obviously incriminating information is 
visible from a publicly accessible place, therefore, in plain view, police 
may seize the evidence without requiring a warrant.224  Placing an item in 
plain view necessarily waives any reasonable expectation of privacy.225  
However, the court did not stop its reasoning there.  Disturbingly, the 
court also said, “placing information on the information superhighway 
necessarily makes said matter accessible to the public, no matter how 
                                                             
219 Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring).  
224 See id. (discussing how under the plain view doctrine, “objects, activities, or 
statements that [one] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because 
no intention to keep them to [oneself] has been exhibited”); see also Hodge, supra note 
19, at 109. 
225 See Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225. 
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many protectionist measures may be taken . . . .”226  This Author, among 
others, believes that such a statement goes too far.   
 
[34] Professor Warren LaFave, a preeminent authority on Fourth 
Amendment law, has argued that an individual should rightfully claim a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a webpage if the 
individual safeguards those contents through password protection.227  This 
argument points out a crucial difference between content and non-content 
data, suggesting that assumption of risk does not defeat this expectation in 
webpage privacy because,  
 
[W]hile a service provider has a need to access information 
regarding the identity of a site holder and the volume and 
extent of her usage, it has no legitimate reason to inspect 
the actual contents of the site, anymore than the postal 
service has a legitimate interest in reading the contents of 
first class mail, or a telephone company has a legitimate 
interest in listening to a customer's conversations.228  
 
In this vein, Professor LaFave has argued that “‘[r]eliance on protections 
such an[sic] individual computer accounts, password protection, and 
perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon 
locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of protection is 
                                                             
226 Id. (emphasis added).  
227 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 721 (4th ed. 2004); see D'Andrea v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 
121 (D. Mass. Ct. 2007).  
228 D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 121.  But see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the possibility that the "Good Samaritan" provision of the 
Communication Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c), might not have preemptive 
effect on a state law, thereby imposing a duty on ISP providers to filter offensive content 
on hosted websites); see also Id. at 122 (discussing how LaFave’s argument, that a 
service provider has no legitimate reason to monitor the contents of an Internet site, may 
not be as rock solid as it appears). 
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penetrable.’”229  This reasoning would provide a greater expectation of 
privacy in password protected or limited-access social networking 
profiles.  The greatest problem with social networking profiles that are 
open to numerous “friends” would then lie in the risk that one of these 
“friends” would pass the information along to the government. 
 
[35] However, the decision discussed above is not the only one to reject 
the idea that e-mail and Internet communication can enjoy reasonable 
expectations of privacy.230  One district court stated that, “while 
individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy, for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, in their home computers, they do not enjoy 
such an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the internet or in  
e-mail which has already arrived at the recipient.”231  However, properly 
understood, this rule should apply only to the actions of the recipient, not 
to any unrelated subsequent search or seizure merely by virtue of the 
communication reaching its recipient. 
 
 
                                                             
229 LAFAVE, supra note 227 (footnote omitted) (quoting Randolph S. Sergeant, Note, A 
Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1189, 1200 (1995); accord D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 121. 
230 See Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26 (explaining that defendant had no 
subjective expectation of privacy in photograph placed on the public medium of the 
Internet, society was not prepared to recognize as reasonable any expectation of privacy 
in information placed on Internet, and the picture was obviously placed on website for 
commercial purposes); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1045 
(9th Cir. 2001) (“No expectation of privacy attaches to electronic communications made 
available through facilities readily available to the public . . . .”); United States v. 
Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in non-content customer information provided to an 
ISP by one of its customers)); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 220 F. Supp. 2d 
4, 13 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002) (holding web-monitoring company's conduct in intercepting 
Internet users' electronic communications with various health-related and medical-related 
Internet websites and sharing of private information about their web browsing habits and 
confidential health information with defendant pharmaceutical companies fell under the 
exception from liability under the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and 
Transactional Records Act). 
231 United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).  
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C. Privacy in E-mail and Other Electronic Communication 
 
[36] In deciding cases involving e-mail privacy and whether the use of 
electronically mediated communication technologies constitutes a waiver 
of privacy rights, courts have tended to analogize e-mail to more 
traditional types of communication, such as letters or telephone calls,232 
although, as mentioned above, not all judges have been apt to follow this 
course.233  Courts have also relied on the privacy policies and terms of use 
propagated by the Internet Service Providers in question,234 as well as the 
identity of the recipient.235  Intermediaries, usually an Internet Service 
Provider (“ISP”), transmit and deliver e-mails like letters or telephone 
calls, so such analogies appear to be well grounded and highly relevant to 
the waiver issue.236  As such, the law ought to apply to e-mail, and other 
forms of private mediated electronic communication, in much the same 
way as it has to its offline counterparts.  Indeed, a number of courts have 
held that, by default, individuals have legitimate privacy interests in their 
e-mail and computer files, despite the use of an intermediary.237   
 
                                                             
232 See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see also Warshak v. 
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 
233 See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The advent of the 
electronic age and . . . the development of desktop computers . . . go beyond the 
established categories of constitutional doctrine. Analogies to other physical objects, such 
as dressers or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we now face as judges 
when applying search and seizure law.”); United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 
508 (W.D. Va. 1999) (“Cyberspace is a nonphysical ‘place’ and its very structure, a 
computer and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth 
Amendment analysis.”), aff’d 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. 2000).  See generally Hodge, 
supra note 19, at 102. 
234 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 104-05 (citing Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417). 
235 United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“The 
expectations of privacy in e-mail transmissions depend in large part on both the type of e-
mail sent and recipient of the e-mail.”). 
236 Id.  
237 See id. at 1184. 
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[37] Additionally, this reasonable expectation applies to communication 
sent from government or work computers.238  Problems arise, however, 
when the intermediary has a policy of monitoring communications sent 
through its service.239  In these cases, the individual waives his or her 
expectation of privacy as a condition of using the service in question.240  
Potentially, a large number of recipients might also diminish an otherwise 
reasonable expectation of privacy.241  This potential caveat is especially 
relevant in the context of OSNs, such as Facebook and MySpace, where 
large numbers of friends may view even limited-access profiles.242  
However, there is a difference between electronic communications 
intended for public consumption, or at least visible to the public at large, 
and those limited to access by a specifically delineated group.243  As such, 
postings to publically accessible websites,244 chat rooms,245 electronic 
                                                             
238 See, e.g., United States v. Long, 61 M.J. 539, 543-44 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005). 
239 See United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326, 330 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating that an 
individual lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mails sent on the Air Force 
system, where a specific notice was given that persons logging on to the system 
consented to monitoring); Hodge, supra note 17, at 105-06; see also United States v. 
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in electronic files on his office computer because of employment 
policies that explicitly authorized the employer to “audit, inspect, and/or monitor” such 
files). 
240 See, e.g., Simons, 206 F.3d at 398. 
241 Hodge, supra note 19, at 105 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419 
(C.A.A.F. 1996)). 
242 See Kevin Lewis et al., The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy 
Settings in an Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 79, 81 (2008).  
243 See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he public 
disclosure of material to an untold number of readers distinguishes bulletin board 
postings from e-mails, which typically have a limited, select number of recipients.”), 
vacated, 532 F.3d 521, (6th Cir. 2008). 
244 See United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) (holding 
that there is no expectation of privacy when posting a photo on publically available 
website). 
245 See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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bulletin boards,246 and social network profiles,247 essentially merit no such 
expectation of privacy. 
 
[38] In Warshak v. United States, the Sixth Circuit analogized the 
Supreme Court precedent in Katz, Smith, and Miller to situations involving 
e-mail communications.248  The court recognized that, as Katz pointed out, 
“the mere fact that a communication is shared with another person does 
not entirely erode all expectations of privacy . . . .”249  In situations of 
shared communication, courts should differentiate between those parties 
with whom the individual shares the communication and those from whom 
the individual shields the communication.250  Despite the fact that a person 
assumes the risk that those with whom he communicates will reveal the 
information to the government,  
 
The same does not necessarily apply, however, to an 
intermediary that merely has the ability to access the 
information sought by the government.  Otherwise phone 
conversations would never be protected, merely because 
the telephone company can access them; letters would 
never be protected, by virtue of the Postal Service’s ability 
to access them; the contents of shared safe deposit boxes or 
storage lockers would never be protected, by virtue of the 
bank or storage company’s ability to access them.251  
 
Courts limit this expectation of privacy in the information stored by the 
intermediary, however, to the content of the communication, as set out in 
Smith.252  The Warshak court held that, 
                                                             
246 See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001). 
247 See Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
248 Warshak, 490 F.3d at 469-70. 
249 Id. at 470. 
250 Id.  
251 Id.  
252 See id. at 471. 
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[A]lthough the government can compel disclosure of a 
shared communication from the party with whom it was 
shared, it can only compel disclosure of the specific 
information to which the subject of its compulsion has been 
granted access.  It cannot, on the other hand, bootstrap an 
intermediary’s limited access to one part of the 
communication (e.g. the phone number) to allow it access 
to another part (the content of the conversation).253  
 
Under this analysis, compelled disclosure of subscriber information and 
related non-content information from an individual’s ISP would not 
violate the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests under the authority of 
Smith and Miller.254  In contrast, “there is a societal expectation that the 
ISP or the phone company” will not reveal the contents of the 
communication “as a matter of course.”255  Indeed, the major OSNs and 
many other ISPs include this in their privacy policies.256  The 
government’s subpoena of the content of the communication from the 
recipient of the e-mail – or the “friend” in the OSN context – however, 
would not infringe on the individual’s interests because of the individual’s 
assumption of that risk.257  This risk does not necessarily extend to the 
intermediate storage of the information, but it arises only after the final 
recipient has accessed the e-mail.258  Additionally, the USA-PATRIOT 
Act259 enlarged the definition of a pen register to include “addressing 
                                                             
253 Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471. 
254 See id. 
255 Id. 
256 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 119. 
257 See Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471; SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 204-05 (noting the 
Department of Justice has interpreted provisions of the Stored Communications Act to 
allow them to issue subpoenas to ISPs for the contents of the e-mail in question). 
258 See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 204-05. 
259 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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information on emails and IP addresses.”260  Government authorization to 
retrieve this information is not difficult to obtain.261 
 
[39] A few circuit court decisions involving use of computer networks 
have addressed this issue.  The Fourth Circuit held that an employee 
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic files on his office 
computer because of employment policies that explicitly authorized the 
employer to “audit, inspect, and/or monitor” such files.262  The Ninth 
Circuit, however, held that a university student did not waive an 
expectation of privacy in his computer files on his personal computer even 
though he attached it to the university network, because the university’s 
policies did not allow blanket monitoring or specifically abrogate such an 
expectation.263  
 
In instances where a user agreement explicitly provides that 
e-mails and other files will be monitored or audited as in 
Simons, the user’s knowledge of this fact may well 
extinguish his reasonable expectation of privacy. Without 
such a statement, however, the service provider’s control 
over the files and ability to access them under certain 
limited circumstances will not be enough to overcome an 
expectation of privacy . . . .264 
 
Although Fourth Amendment law contains doctrines that might potentially 
protect information in limited-access profiles, its application to OSN 
profile information has not been tested, and some doubt exists as to 
whether protection would survive constitutional scrutiny under the 
                                                             
260 SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 205. 
261 See id. at 206. 
262 United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000). 
263 See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 
264 Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) vacated, 532 F.3d 521 
(6th Cir. 2008).  
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approach the Supreme Court has taken with respect to the rules described 
above.265  
 
VI.  REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY UNDER THE  
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
 
[40] As in the United States, “[t]here is no explicit constitutional 
protection of privacy in Canada . . . .”266  Canadian privacy protection 
under its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, however, seeks to protect the 
“dignity, integrity and autonomy” of its citizens.267  The Canadian 
approach may provide a desirable middle ground between the privacy 
approaches of the United States and Europe.268  However, recent decisions 
determining the reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy 
in limited-access OSN profile information have not provided much 
guidance.269  
 
A.  The Parameters of Canadian Privacy Protection 
 
[41] Two sections of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provide 
relevant privacy protection; Section 8 of the Canadian Charter protects 
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government,270 in much the same way as the Fourth Amendment in the 
United States,271 and Section 7 protects the “security of the person.”272  
                                                             
265 See Hodge, supra note 19, at 118-19. 
266 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 378. 
267 R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, paras. 24, 27 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL). 
268 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 357. 
269 See Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 1, 32-33 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) 
(WL); Murphy v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, paras. 1, 16, 17, 19, 20 (Can. Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.) (WL). 
270 See Canadian Charter supra note 38, § 8.  
271 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 27, at 378. 
272 Canadian Charter, supra note 38, § 7.  
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Both of these sections rely in some measure on an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.273  In 1984, the Canadian Supreme Court declared 
that such an expectation lies at the core of Section 8.274  Like the 
American Fourth Amendment, Section 8 only protects against 
governmental intrusions into expectations that are objectively 
reasonable.275  In the criminal context, the court has outlined three 
conditions that must be met for a search to be reasonable.276  These 
requirements compare to those found in their U.S. counterpart, including 
prior independent judicial authorization, often a warrant, based on 
probable grounds that evidence of the offence will be found at the 
searched location.277  Later courts, however, have determined that these 
criteria do not establish necessarily hard and fast rules strictly applied in 
every case, and some measure of reasonable analysis of the context of any 
given search may warrant some leniency.278  Rather, the requirements are 
designed to ensure a proper “balancing of the societal interests in 
protecting individual dignity, integrity and autonomy with effective law 
enforcement.” 279   
                                                             
273 Jason M. Young, Constitutional Rights in New Technologies in Canada, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 57, 65 (Ronald Leenes,  Bert-Jaap 
Koops & Paul De Hert eds., 2008) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS]; see R. v. 
Mills, 1999 CarswellAlta 1055 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL); Hunter v. Southam, Inc., 1984 
CarswellAlta 121, para. 25 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL). 
274 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 63; see Southam, Inc., 1984 
CarswellAlta 121, para. 25.  
275 See Southam, Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, para. 24-25; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
supra note 273, at 63. 
276 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 63-64. 
277 See Southam, Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, para. 23; STANLEY A. COHEN, PRIVACY, 
CRIME AND TERROR LEGAL RIGHTS AND SECURITY IN A TIME OF PERIL 114 (2005); 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 275, at 64. 
278 See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, 1990 CarswellOnt 92, para. 96 (Can. 
S.C.C.) (WL);; COHEN, supra note 277; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 64; 
see also R. v. Collins, 1987 CarswellBC 94, para. 22 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL). 
279 R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, para. 26 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL).   
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[42] Additionally, Section 8 applies to the appropriation of digital data 
and files,280 and works alongside Section 7’s inherent privacy protection, 
which protects an individual’s privacy as “either incidental to personal 
security, or an aspect of personal liberty.”281  When determining whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in stored or acquired data and 
other information, the courts have delineated a long list of relevant factors 
to consider.282  In application, “the most determinative factor” in the 
context of digital information has become the nature of the information 
itself.283  Business information receives much less protection than more 
personal data that reflects the “biographical core” of the individual, such 
as information that reveals personal lifestyle choices.284  Additional non-
personal information, such as public utility records, may not attract a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.285  In R. v. Plant, the Supreme Court 
stated that it agreed with the aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding 
in United States v Miller that “[i]n order for constitutional protection to be 
extended . . . the information seized must be of a personal and confidential 
nature.”286  The court also held that,  
 
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and 
autonomy . . . [section] 8 . . . seek[s] to protect a 
biographical core of personal information which 
individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to 
maintain and control from dissemination to the state.  This 
would include information which tends to reveal intimate 
                                                             
280 See R. v. Wong, 1990 CarswellOnt 58, paras. 8, 10, 13 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL), 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 64-65. 
281 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 65 (footnote omitted). 
282 Id. at 65-66. 
283 Id. at 66. 
284 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
285 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 68. 
286 R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, para. 23, 27 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL). 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 4 
  44 
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the 
individual.287  
B.  Communications Privacy in Canada 
 
[43] The Canadian Criminal code provides strong privacy protection to 
telephone communications.288  According to the Supreme Court, “the 
interception of private communications is a serious matter, to be 
considered only for the investigation of serious offences, in the presence 
of probable grounds, and with a serious testing of the need for electronic 
interception in the context of the particular investigation . . . .”289  Courts 
require judicial authorization to intercept telephone conversations,290 and 
only generally allow interception when “practically speaking, [there is] no 
other reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances 
of the particular criminal inquiry.”291  Despite these established rules 
regarding wiretapping, however, some questions remain about how this 
protection applies to e-mail and information in other digital contexts.292  
Some lower courts have found that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists in e-mail correspondence, thus bringing it within the protections of 
the Charter,293 however, this expectation of privacy is lower than that 
granted to “first class (letter) mail, because unencrypted e-mails are 
vulnerable to being read by intermediaries.”294  After Canadian adoption 
                                                             
287 Id. at para. 27.  
288 See CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 71-72. 
289 R. v. Araujo, 2000 CarswellBC 2440, para. 29 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL) (emphasis 
omitted).  
290 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 71. 
291 Araujo, 2000 CarswellBC 2440, para. 29 (emphasis omitted). 
292 See CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 72. 
293 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 72; see, e.g., R. v. Weir, 1998 
CarswellAlta 151, para. 77 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (WL). 
294 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 72 -73; see Weir, 1998 CarswellAlta 
151, paras. 72-75, 77 (“The envelope on first class mail shields the contents of the 
message. The information on the cover carries a lower expectation of privacy than does 
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of the European Convention on Cybercrime, the Government stated that it 
would subject orders for the production of “specified computer data” or 
“subscriber information” and Internet traffic data containing mostly  
non-content data to this lower expectation of privacy as well.295  In a 
Department of Justice consultation paper published in 2002, the 
government stated that “the standard for Internet traffic data should be 
more in line with that required for telephone records and dial number 
recorders in light of the lower expectation of privacy in a telephone 
number or Internet address, as opposed to the content of a 
communication.”296  The constitutionality of this lower standard in such 
data remains in question because Section 8 of the Charter “protects people, 
not places”297 or things, and the degree of intrusiveness of an action 
should depend on “to what extent disclosure of [the] information would 
impact the reasonable expectation of the individual’s privacy.”298 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the message inside. In the e-mail environment, the headers (hidden and exposed) can be 
likened to the information on the envelope. The message is directed by its headers. Much 
repair work to e-mail can be done through headers. Like the outside of the envelope, the 
headers have a lower expectation of privacy. The difference between the two types of 
cover is that in first class mail the cover is respected. In e-mail, the cover is (or was in 
June of 1996) routinely violated in order to repair the technology. There are two or three 
levels of violation depending on the type of repair done and excluding a repair done by 
deleting the message or by enlarging the e-mail box. The size of the attachments may be 
viewed. The list of attachment names may be viewed. The message itself may be opened 
which can include looking at the message and the attachments or either. These facts about 
the technology help [this court] to conclude the e-mail message is unlike first class mail 
in the level of privacy that it can attract. Another difference between e-mail and first class 
mail is that in order to make an e-mail message truly private, one can encrypt it.”). 
295 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 73-74 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
296 DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., LAWFUL ACCESS – CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 11-12 (2002), 
available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/la-al.pdf. 
297 R. v. Edwards, 1996 CarswellOnt 1916, para. 45 (Can. S.C.C.) (WL). 
298 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 273, at 75 (citing Edwards, 1996 CarswellOnt 
1916). 
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C.  Recent Decisions Involving OSN Profile Information 
 
[44] Recent cases involving requests for discovery of profile 
information have tested Canada’s respect for privacy in information 
contained in OSN profiles.  In fact, it is “beyond controversy” in Canada 
that “a person’s Facebook profile may contain documents relevant to the 
issues in an action.”299  The courts have had little difficulty allowing such 
requests for publically available information, and courts have admitted 
such information as evidence in a number of proceedings.300  However, in 
Murphy v. Perger and Leduc v. Roman – both personal injury suits arising 
out of automobile accidents – the court considered the appropriateness of 
requests for limited-access Facebook profile information.301  In Murphy, 
the plaintiff posted photos on her publicly accessible profile that showed 
her “engaged in various social activities.”302  The defendant wanted access 
to any photographs on the limited-access portion of the plaintiff’s 
profile.303  In granting the defendant’s motion, the court stated that  
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that there are likely to 
be relevant photographs on the site for two reasons.  First, 
www.facebook.com is a social networking site where [the 
court] understand[s] a very large number of photographs 
                                                             
299 Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 23 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL). 
300 See id. (“Photographs of parties posted to their Facebook profiles have been admitted 
as evidence relevant to demonstrating a party’s ability to engage in sports and other 
recreational activities where the plaintiff has put his enjoyment of life or ability to work 
in issue: Cikojevic v. Timm, 2008 BCSC 74 (B.C. Master), para. 47; R. (C.M.) v. R 
(O.D.), 2008 NBQB 253 (N.B. Q.B.), paras. 54 and 61; Kourtesis v. Joris, [2007] O.J. 
No. 2677 (Ont. S.C.J.), paras. 72 to 75; Goodridge (Litigation Guardian of) v. King, 161 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 984 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [2007 CarswellOnt 7637 (Ont. S.C.J.)], para. 128. In 
one case the discovery of photographs of a party posted on a MySpace webpage formed 
the basis for a request to produce additional photographs not posted on the site: Weber v. 
Dyck, [2007] O.J. No. 2384 (Ont. Master).”). 
301 See Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 1; Murphy v. Peger, 2007 CarswellOnt 
9439, paras. 1-2 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL). 
302 Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 4. 
303 See id. at para. 1. 
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are deposited by its audience.  Second, given that the public 
site includes photographs, it seems reasonable to conclude 
the private site would as well.   
On the issue of relevancy, in this case, clearly the 
plaintiff must consider that some photographs are relevant 
to her claim because she has served photographs of her 
prior to the accident, notwithstanding that they are only 
"snapshots in time."304 
 
The court ordered the production of the limited-access profile information 
at issue, concluding that “any invasion of privacy is minimal and is 
outweighed by the defendant's need to have the photographs in order to 
assess the case.”305  The court considered the number of the plaintiff’s 
friends who could access the sought after contents of the plaintiff’s profile 
as specifically determinative, holding that “[t]he plaintiff could not have a 
serious expectation of privacy given that 366 people have been granted 
access to the private site.”306 
 
[45] More recently, the Superior Court of Ontario rejected the decision 
of a Master and permitted the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff on 
his Supplementary Affidavit of Documents “regarding the kind of content 
posted on his [private] Facebook profile.”307  In Leduc, the defendant 
sought production of material on the plaintiff’s private profile after the 
plaintiff admitted during his psychiatric examination that he had many 
friends on Facebook.308  His Facebook profile was almost exclusively 
private, and the public page contained only his name and photograph.309  
In his contrary decision, the Master had concluded the defendant engaged 
                                                             
304 Id. at paras. 17-18. 
305 Id. at para. 20 (emphasis added). 
306 Id.  
307 Leduc v. Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 36-37 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL). 
308 See id. at paras. 3, 6. 
309 Id. at para. 5. 
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in “‘a fishing expedition,’” had failed to show that relevant materials were 
likely to be found in the plaintiff’s profile, and had also failed to ask the 
plaintiff during discovery whether any relevant photos existed in any 
form.310 
 
[46] The court found no problem with the idea that information 
obtained from publicly accessible OSN profiles fell within the proper 
scope of discovery.311  The court also agreed with the Murphy decision 
that “it is reasonable to infer from the presence of content on the party’s 
public profile that similar content likely exists on the private profile.”312  
However, most importantly, the court concluded that  
 
Where, as in the present case, a party maintains only a 
private Facebook profile and his public page posts nothing 
other than information about the user’s identity . . . a court 
can infer from the social networking purpose of Facebook, 
and the applications it offers to users such as the posting of 
photographs, that users intend to take advantage of 
Facebook’s applications to make personal information 
available to others.313 
 
The court further found that  
 
A party who maintains a private, or limited access, 
Facebook profile stands in no different position than one 
who sets up a publicly-available profile . . . .  Mr. Leduc 
exercised control over a social networking and information 
site to which he allowed designated “friends” access.  It is 
reasonable to infer that his social networking site likely 
                                                             
310 See id. at para. 32. 
311 See id. at paras. 27, 29. 
312 Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, para. 30. 
313 Id. at para. 31.   
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contains some content relevant to the issue of how Mr. 
Leduc has been able to lead his life since the accident.314 
 
These two decisions, although concerned primarily with the application of 
Canadian Civil Procedure rules to OSN profile information, illustrate the 
limited sanctity afforded an individual’s otherwise subjective expectation 
that his private OSN profile information will stay private.315  When courts 
define an order to produce limited-access photographs and other 
information as a “minimal” invasion of privacy, solely because courts can 
“infer” from the general nature of social networking websites that a 
plaintiff has posted relevant information to their profile, courts severely 
curtail an individual’s subjective – and arguably reasonable – expectation 
of privacy.316 
 
VII.  PROTECTING PRIVACY ON GROUNDS OF HUMAN DIGNITY:  
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 
 
[47] Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“Convention”) delineates a specific right related to individual privacy, 
namely that signatory nations respect a person’s right to “his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”317  This right provides for 
both negative and positive obligations upon public authorities bound by 
                                                             
314 Id. at para. 32. 
315 See generally id. at paras. 31-32; Murphey v. Perger, 2007 CarswellOnt 9439, para. 
17-18 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL). 
316 See Roman, 2009 CarswellOnt 843, paras. 25, 32. 
317 ECHR, supra note 39 (“[1] Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence.  [2] There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”). 
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the Convention.318  Public authorities may only interfere with this right to 
a private life when, “in accordance with the law,” such action “is 
necessary in a democratic society” and related to important national 
interests such as “national security, public safety or the economic  
well-being of the country,” or “for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”319  This requirement therefore compels a balancing of 
“the competing interests of the individual and of the whole 
community.”320  The court has held that the phrase “in accordance with the 
law” means any interfering action must accord with national law and that 
the national law itself must reflect the rights protected by the 
Convention.321   
 
[48] Indeed, because “there must be a measure of legal protection in 
domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the 
rights safeguarded by [Article 8 § 1]”322 the Court subjects the national 
laws themselves to its test of adequacy under Article 8.323  National laws 
must give individuals adequate warning of those circumstances where 
national authorities may interfere with the individual’s private life.324  If 
                                                             
318 See, K.U. v. Finland, No. 2872/02, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52, 1248 § 42 (2009) 
(“[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially to protect the individual against 
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to 
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there 
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life.”) 
(citation omitted). 
319 ECHR, supra note 39, at art.8 § 1. 
320 See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 68 § 57. 
321 Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 867 § 45 
(2007). 
322 Id.  
323 Id. § 46. 
324 See, e.g., id. 
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they do not, action in reliance on the law that interferes with an 
individual’s private life may violate the Convention.325 
 
[49] Despite differences among various jurisdictions,326 this European 
take on privacy generally centers on protecting an individual’s dignity.327  
Protecting dignity, unlike the more American focus on liberty, finds its 
focus on guarding social status and protecting individuals from 
humiliation and preventing unwarranted social perception, and is a social 
concept that reflects social norms.328  These social values are apparent in 
European data protection legislation,329 as well as in case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  National courts in dualist jurisdictions, 
like the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland, which require 
implementing legislation to give full effect to the Convention in domestic 
law, “are obliged to take ‘into account’ the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights . . . when determining questions which arise ‘in 
connection’ with the right to respect for private life” in the implementing 
legislation.330  In addition, with adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Union officially acceded to the ECHR331 and the Convention 
has become part of the general law of the Union332 granting the ECHR’s 
decisions greater institutional backing in Europe.  The Treaty of Lisbon 
                                                             
325 See id. § 48-49. 
326 See generally Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 389-90. 
327 Id. at 388. 
328 See id. 
329 Id. at 390. 
330 N. A. Moreham, The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on 
Human Rights: A Re-Examination, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV., 2008, at 44, 44. 
331 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities, art. 1, § 8, para. 2, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 
306) [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/ 
12007L/htm/12007L.html. 
332 Id. at para. 3. 
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also grants the European Charter – and its core respect for human dignity 
– “the same legal value as the Treaties.”333 
 
A.  The Right to a Private Life Under Article 8 
 
[50] The European Court of Human Rights has broadly interpreted the 
right of privacy.334  Among its broad protections, Article 8’s guarantee of 
a private life “is primarily intended to ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations 
with other human beings.”335  It specifically protects an individual’s right 
to “a sphere within which he or she can freely pursue the development and 
fulfilment [sic] of his or her personality”336 and “the right to establish 
details of their identity as individual human beings.”337   Protection for the 
development of personality does not apply only to private matters kept 
within the individual’s closest circle,338 but explicitly encompasses the 
“right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and 
the outside world” as well.339  Interaction with others – even in a public 
context or involving matters of a business or professional nature340 – may 
                                                             
333 Id. at para. 1. 
334 See infra notes 335-41 and accompanying text. 
335 Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 66 § 50; see also Botta v. Italy, 
1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 412, 422 § 32; Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 33 
§ 29 (1992). 
336 Sidabras v. Lithuania, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 367, 385 § 43. 
337 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31 § 90; see also Pretty v. 
United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 193 § 61. 
338 Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 § 29. 
339 Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 142 § 57.  
340 Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33-34 § 29 (“[I]t is, after all, in the course of their 
working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, 
opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world.”). 
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fall within the scope of Article 8’s notion of “private life.”341  When 
determining whether a person’s activities in the public sphere implicate 
private life considerations, that person’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy can be a significant factor.342  As such, appropriate and expected 
analog or technical monitoring – as by closed-circuit video cameras – may 
not be a problem.343  However, “the recording of the data and the 
systematic or permanent nature of the record may give rise to such 
considerations.”344  In a recent case, sounding much like Warren and 
Brandeis in 1890, the court stated that “increased vigilance in protecting 
private life is necessary to contend with new communication technologies 
which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data.”345 
 
B.  Legitimate and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
[51] All individuals – both those known broadly to the public and those 
absent from the public spotlight – “enjoy a ‘legitimate expectation’ of 
protection and respect for their private [lives].”346  In addition, individuals 
may enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in their telephone calls,347  
e-mails, and Internet usage,348 which extends to information about the 
length and time of the communication as well as the numbers dialled.349  
                                                             
341 Von Hannover v Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 66 § 50; Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 142 § 57; P.G. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 217 § 56.  
342 See P.G., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 217 § 57; see also Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
142 § 58. 
343 See Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 142 §§ 58-59; P.G., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R at 217-18 
§ 57. 
344 Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 142 § 59; see P.G., 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R at 218 § 57. 
345 Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 71 § 70. 
346 Id. §  69; Halford v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1004, 1016 §45. 
347 See, e.g., Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 866 
§ 42 (2007); see Halford, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1016 § 45. 
348 Copland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 at 866 § 42. 
349 See id. at 867 § 43. 
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Under ECHR jurisprudence, an expectation of privacy exists in this  
non-content oriented information such as “the date and length of telephone 
conversations and in particular the numbers dialled [sic]” because “such 
information constitutes an ‘integral element of the communications made 
by telephone.’”350  This recognition contrasts with United States law 
withholding constitutional privacy protection for “pen register” 
information because, by initiating the communication, the individual has 
voluntarily revealed it to the third party communications service provider, 
thus waiving any legitimate expectation.351   
 
[52] The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test found its way into the 
ECHR’s private life jurisprudence in the 1997 case of Halford v. The 
United Kingdom.352  In that case, a government employee sued the 
government for intercepting telephone conversations made from her office 
and home phones and reviewing the resulting transcripts.353  Because Ms. 
Halford had no reason to expect anyone might monitor her telephone 
conversations, the court concluded that she maintained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her calls made from her office telephone.354  
Following Halford, the court has begun to utilize the reasonable 
expectations test as “a nuanced approach to every new case” in line with 
common sense.355  In Von Hannover v. Germany, Judge Zupančič stated in 
his concurring opinion that he would suggest the outcome of that case turn 
                                                             
350 Id. (quoting Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 1984 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on 
H.R. 289, 292 (Eur. Ct. H.R.); see also Moreham, supra note 333, at 63. 
351 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).  On the other hand, Title III of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) provides for some limited protection of 
pen register type information against action by the government.  See generally Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-23 (2006).  Under Title III, this 
requires a court order upon a showing that information relevant to a criminal 
investigation is likely to be obtained.  See id § 3123(a). 
352 Halford, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1016 §§ 44-45. 
353 See id. at 1010-11 §§ 16-17. 
354 Id. at 1016 § 45. 
355 Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 78  (Zupančič, J., concurring). 
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on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test set out in Halford.356  The 
court has also found the test useful in a number of other contexts.357 
 
C.  Protection for Activities in the Public Sphere 
 
[53] Another major difference between the jurisprudence of the ECHR 
and Fourth Amendment law in the United States is the fact that public 
activities can be appropriate subject matter of protected private life under 
Article 8.358  In a recent, and rather famous example, Von Hannover v. 
Germany, the court held that Princess Caroline of Monaco had a 
“legitimate expectation” in the protection of her private life that extended 
to her activities in public.359  The court found that the German laws that 
allowed the publication of paparazzi photographs and articles about the 
applicant’s non-official activities violated Article 8.360  Interestingly, the 
court found that “scenes from her daily life . . . such as engaging in sport, 
out walking, leaving a restaurant or on holiday” constituted “activities of a 
purely private nature.”361  Thus, even in the case of a person used to the 
public spotlight and, “although the public has a right to be informed,” the 
situation in that case “[did] not come within the sphere of any political or 
public debate because the published photos and accompanying 
commentaries relate exclusively to details of the applicant’s private 
life.”362 
                                                             
356 Id. 
357 See, e.g., Peev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 64209/01, HUDOC, § 38 (Eur. Ct. H. R.) (July 
26, 2007); Perry v. United Kingdom, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 141, 151 § 37, 153 §43 
(using the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the Court decided that the covert 
filming of a person on the premises of the police was an interference with his private 
life); P.G. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, 217 § 57; see also Peck v. 
United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 142 § 58. 
358 See supra Part V; infra pp. 56-57. 
359 Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 48 §§ 8-10, 73 § 78 (2004) (Zupančič, J., 
concurring (internal quotation marks omitted). 
360 See id. at 64 § 45 (majority opinion). 
361 Id. at 69 § 61. 
362 Id. at 70 § 64. 
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D.  Protection for Communication and Correspondence 
 
[54] The Court has not qualified the Article 8 term “correspondence” in 
the same way as the term “life” by any requirement that it be “private.”363  
Telephone calls, e-mail, diaries, letters, and Internet usage, even in places 
of employment, fall within the scope of Article 8’s prohibition on 
unjustified interference with an individual’s correspondence.364  As 
previously stated, individuals may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in these forms of communication.365  Unjustified monitoring, 
recording, or other interference with an individual’s correspondence 
violates Article 8’s prohibition.366 
 
[55] In Niemietz v. Germany, the ECHR concluded that a search of the 
applicant’s law office and client files, pursuant to a court ordered warrant, 
violated Article 8.367  The court found that the term “correspondence” 
encompassed some information contained in the lawyer’s client files 368 
and that the warrant was overly broad despite being in accordance with 
German law.369  Because the warrant and search were not proportionate to 
the legitimate aims of the law, the Court concluded the search violated the 
applicant’s rights under Article 8.370 
                                                             
363 Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at, 34 § 41 32 (1992). 
364 See Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 866 § 41 
(2007); see also Moreham, supra note 330, at 62-64. 
365 See Copland,  45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 at 866 § 42 (holding true unless, for instance in 
the workplace, they have advance warning that their use was subject to monitoring); Von 
Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66 § 51; Halford v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1004, 1016 § 45. 
366 See Enea v. Italy, App. No. 74912/01, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3, 135 § 135 (2009) (ordering 
monitoring of a prisoner’s correspondence); Huvig v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39,  52 § 
25 (1990) (telephone tapping). 
367 See Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29 § 11, 41 § 59. 
368 Id. at 34 § 32. 
369 See id. at35 §§ 34-35, 36 § 37. 
370 Id. at36 §§ 37-38. 
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[56] In Copland v. The United Kingdom, the court held that a public 
college’s monitoring of an employee’s telephone and e-mail 
correspondence and Internet usage, “in order to ascertain whether the 
applicant was making excessive use of College facilities for personal 
purposes,” violated Article 8.371  The government admitted to conducting 
“analysis of the college telephone bills showing telephone numbers called, 
the dates and times of the calls and their length and cost.”372  The 
government also admitted to analyzing the applicant’s Internet usage,373 
and logging her e-mail correspondence.374  The court held that because the 
applicant “had been given no warning that her calls would be liable to 
monitoring,” she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her telephone 
calls, e-mail, and Internet usage.375  Consequently, “the collection and 
storage of personal information relating to the applicant's telephone, as 
well as to her email and internet usage, without her knowledge, amounted 
to an interference with her right to respect for her private life and 
correspondence within the meaning of [Article 8].”376  Because no United 
Kingdom law directly applied in force during the relevant time frame, the 
employer’s conduct was not “in accordance with the law” or in 
furtherance of other legitimate aims.377  As such, the conduct violated 
Article 8.378 
 
[57] Recently, in the case of K.U. v. Finland, the ECHR decided a 
rather different question related to Article 8 and involving the use of the 
                                                             
371 Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 860 § 10 
(2007). 
372 Id. 
373 Id. at 860 § 11. 
374 Id. § 12. 
375 Id. at 866 § 42. 
376 Copland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 at 867 § 44. 
377 Id. at 868 § 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
378 Id. at § 49. 
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Internet.379  The court found that communications privacy and freedom of 
expression must, on occasion, take a back seat to violations of an 
individual’s private life in the context of criminal activity.380  In the case, 
an unknown person placed a personal dating advertisement on the Internet, 
identifying himself as the applicant, a 12-year-old boy, and claiming an 
interest in a sexual encounter with another boy or man.381  The applicant 
received an e-mail from a man, offering to meet him, and “then to see 
what you want.”382  The boy’s father contacted the police and attempted to 
discover the identity of the person who posted the advertisement, but the 
ISP refused to turn over the information on confidentiality grounds.383  
The Helsinki District Court also refused a request from the police to 
require the ISP turn over the information.384  The ECHR reiterated that 
respect for private or family life imposed positive obligations on the 
State,385 and held that “where fundamental values and essential aspects of 
private life are at stake, [Article 8] requires efficient criminal-law 
provisions.”386  Because the State did not provide the applicant or the 
police with an effective opportunity to fully address the interference by 
identifying the perpetrator, the State violated Article 8.387  The court stated 
that,  
 
Although freedom of expression and confidentiality of 
communications are primary considerations and users of 
                                                             
379 See generally K.U. v. Finland, No. 2872/02, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52, 1246 § 35 (2009). 
380 See id. at 1248 § 45. 
381 See id. at 1239 §§ 7-8. 
382 Id. § 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
383 Id. § 9. 
384 See Finland, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 at 1239 §§ 10-11. 
385 Id. at 1248 § 42. 
386 Id. § 43. 
387 See id. at 1250 § 49. 
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telecommunications and internet services must have a 
guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression 
will be respected, such guarantee cannot be absolute and 
must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, 
such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.388 
 
[58] As these decisions make clear, the privacy protection granted by 
Article 8 of the Convention goes well beyond that granted by the Fourth 
Amendment in the United States.  In addition, these decisions also show 
the strong tendency of the court to accept a much broader view of what 
constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.389  Much of this effect 
likely owes its origins to the Convention’s conception of protecting private 
life out of respect for human dignity, rather than focusing merely on 
control.390  Granted, the court’s decisions turn on the issue of whether the 
state has acted in accordance with national laws authorizing the action in 
question.391  However, as mentioned earlier, the national laws remain 
subject to the court’s review and the court has actively found violations 
when state action infringes an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.392  By finding these reasonable expectations in public activities, 
e-mail, Internet usage, communication from work, and non-content 
communication information – many of which would not withstand current 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny – the court protected the theoretical 
groundwork of protecting human dignity and the right to a private life.  
The court therefore potentially provided greater protection to the  
quasi-private personal information posted to limited–access OSN profiles 
intended only for viewing by a defined audience.  
 
                                                             
388 Finland, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 at 1250 § 49. (emphasis added). 
389 See, e.g., id. at 1250 § 49. 
390 See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 29, at 388-89. 
391 See, e.g., Copland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37, 867 
§ 46 (2007). 
392 See id. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
[59] Many OSN users subjectively expect only those to whom they 
grant access will view the information they post or upload to their 
profiles.393  This conception builds on the privacy tools embedded into 
technologies employed by the OSNs, which allow users the opportunity to 
control their own privacy settings.394  It is a conception built on 
expectations of selective anonymity395 and network privacy.396  However, 
concerns about preserving reputation and dignity often stimulate control 
exercised by these users when they restrict their privacy settings.    These 
concerns are legitimate, and these expectations arguably reasonable.  Yet 
few courts respect these expectations as something that society is currently 
prepared to recognize as reasonable, and many courts have not yet tackled 
the issue head on.397  Although, with the numbers of online socializers 
growing398 – likely concomitant with the number of those holding these 
subjective expectations of OSN privacy – and the judiciary becoming 
more familiar with the technology and with these types of cases, perhaps 
that recognition is possible in the not so distant future.  This recognition 
can be facilitated in multiple ways, including, as this paper has argued, by 
adopting more contemporary conceptions of what constitutes reasonable 
expectations of privacy and by affording more respect for human dignity 
in tests of reasonableness.  Because the private life jurisprudence of the 
ECHR, rooted in the importance of protecting human dignity and 
reputation by actively preserving respect for the private life and personal 
matters of the individual, covers the important elements of relationship 
building, individual relations with other human beings, and the 
development of personal identity – and not only in purely private settings 
                                                             
393 See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1001-02. 
394 See id. at 1035, 1045-46. 
395 See id. at 1025. 
396 See id. at 1045-46. 
397 See See Levin & Abril, supra note 5, at 1011. 
398 See id. at 1017-19.  
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– its application in the digital communication context fills a void found in 
the laws of other jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
